Understanding Adversarial Robustness: The Trade-off between Minimum and
  Average Margin by Wu, Kaiwen & Yu, Yaoliang
UNDERSTANDING ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS: THE
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN MINIMUM AND AVERAGE MARGIN
KAIWEN WU AND YAOLIANG YU
Abstract. Deep models, while being extremely versatile and accurate, are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks: slight perturbations that are imperceptible
to humans can completely flip the prediction of deep models. Many attack
and defense mechanisms have been proposed, although a satisfying solution
still largely remains elusive. In this work, we give strong evidence that during
training, deep models maximize the minimum margin in order to achieve high
accuracy, but at the same time decrease the average margin hence hurting
robustness. Our empirical results highlight an intrinsic trade-off between
accuracy and robustness for current deep model training. To further address this
issue, we propose a new regularizer to explicitly promote average margin, and
we verify through extensive experiments that it does lead to better robustness.
Our regularized objective remains Fisher-consistent, hence asymptotically can
still recover the Bayes optimal classifier.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, training more accurate classifiers has been much of the focus of
machine learning research. More recently, as machine learning models start to
penetrate into safety-critical applications, their robustness against random or even
adversarial manipulations has drawn a lot of attention. The work of Szegedy et al.
[1] demonstrated surprisingly that it is possible to craft very minimal changes to an
input image that (a) is clearly not perceivable by humans but (b) can completely
flip the predictions of state-of-the-art deep models. Such detrimental perturbations
are called adversarial examples and have raised serious concerns on the safety of
deep models.
Since the work of Szegedy et al. [1], a sequence of works have proposed new
attack algorithms to generate adversarial examples [e.g. 2–9], as well as defensive
techniques [e.g. 10–14] to train more robust models. There even appears to be an
arm race between attack and defense techniques: new defense techniques are shown
nonrobust under stronger attacks shortly after being proposed [15]. Thus, a line
of research focusing on provable certification of (non)robustness has emerged. For
example, one can use the Lipschitz constant of the network to provide a lower bound
on the amount of needed adversarial perturbations [e.g. 16–19]. More recently,
certification methods base on mixed integer programming (MIP) [20, 21] have been
proposed to provide more accurate lower bounds. However, due to the NP-hardness
of MIP, convex relaxations [22–27] have been popular for scaling these provable
certification methods to larger models.
In this paper, we study adversarial robustness from a margin perspective. The
notion of margin distribution dates back to [28–31], which provide generalization
bounds based on the margin distribution. Later on, algorithms that control margin
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distribution for better generalization performance have been proposed [32]. In
this work, however, we connect the notion of margin with adversarial robustness,
and we reveal a surprising trade-off between minimum and average margin in
standard deep model training. In particular, the recent result in [33] implies that
on a linearly separable dataset a linear classifier trained with (stochastic) gradient
descent converges to the SVM solution, under mild conditions on the loss function.
Since SVM explicitly maximizes the minimum margin, any linear classifier would
eventually achieve the same. However, our experiments reveal that the average
margin is greatly reduced during training. In other words, models maximize the
minimum margin at the expense of reducing the average margin hence becoming
more susceptible to adversarial attacks. This surprising phenomenon was also
confirmed on linearly nonseparable datasets and a variety of nonlinear classifiers.
Interestingly, a few defense methods based on margin maximization have been
proposed [34–36], which through our work, should be understood as maximizing the
average margin, as opposed to the minimum margin.
To overcome the trade-off between minimum margin and average margin in
standard training, we propose the standard training objective with an average-
margin promoting regularizer. We prove that the regularized objective remains
Fisher consistent, if the original loss is so. This means as sample size grows, the
classifier obtained through optimizing our regularized objective still approaches the
Bayes optimal classifier, while potentially is much more robust than standard training.
Our regularizer can be easily extended to multiclass and nonlinear classifiers. We
confirm the latter point through extensive experiments on two standard datasets
and a variety of different models and settings.
To summarize, we make the following contributions in this work:
• We reveal the intrinsic trade-off between minimum margin and average margin;
• We propose a new regularizer that explicitly promotes average margin and retains
Fisher consistency;
• We perform extensive experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our new regular-
izer.
2. Background
We consider the multi-category classification problem. Given a set of n training
instances {(xi, yi) ∈ X × [c] : i = 1, . . . , n}, where the feature domain X ⊆ Rd and
[c] := {1, . . . , c} with c ≥ 2 the number of categories, we are interested in finding
a classifier h : X → [c], or equivalently, a set partition F1, . . . ,Fc of the domain X
such that ∪kFk = X and for all k 6= l, Fk ∩ Fl = ∅. Often in practice, the classifier h
is learned through a vector-valued function f : X → Rc, with the argmax prediction
rule employed to predict the label yˆ of a test sample x as follows:
yˆ = yˆ(x) := arg max
k=1,...,c
fk(x), fk : X → R, f = (f1, . . . , fc).(1)
As is well-known, the two representations of a classifier, i.e. either through a set
partition {Fk} or through a vector-valued function f , are equivalent. We will use
both representations interchangeably.
In their seminal work, Szegedy et al. [1] defined the robustness of a classifier f on
a test sample x as the minimum perturbation needed to flip its prediction (c.f. (1)):
r(x) = inf{‖z‖ : x+ z ∈ X , yˆ(x+ z) 6= yˆ(x)},(2)
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where ‖ · ‖ is an abstract norm (e.g. the familiar `p norm) for measuring the
amount of perturbation. This notion of robustness turns out to have a very intuitive
geometric meaning, as we detail below. We remind that we also represent a classifier
f as a set partition {F1, . . . ,Fc}.
For any x ∈ X , define yˆ(x) ∈ [c] so that x ∈ Fyˆ(x), i.e. yˆ(x) is the predicted label
of our classifer. We define the distance from a point x ∈ X to a set F ⊆ X as:
d(x,F) := inf{‖x− z‖ : z ∈ F}.(3)
Recall that the notations clF, intF, F¯ and bdF denote the closure, interior, comple-
ment and the boundary1 of a point set F, respectively. We remark that for any set
F:
d(x,F) =
{
0, if x ∈ clF
d(x,bdF), otherwise
,(4)
which will be important when we aim to optimize some function of the distance.
Note that d(x,Fyˆ) is the distance to the decision boundary, which captures the
definition (2) exactly:
Proposition 1. Let f : X → Rc be a vector-valued function that, if augmented with
the argmax prediction rule (1), leads to the following sets (classifier): for all k ∈ [c],
Fk := {x ∈ X : fk(x) = max
l=1,...,c
fl(x)},(5)
where we break ties arbitrarily. Then the robustness definition in Equation (2) equals
to d(x,Fyˆ).
We are now ready to define the individual margin of a sample pair (x, y) w.r.t.
the classifier {Fk} as:
(6) m(x, y) := m(x, y; {Fk}) := sign(yˆ(x), y) · d(x,bdFyˆ),
where we define sign(yˆ, y) = 1 if yˆ = y and sign(yˆ, y) = −1 otherwise. Namely,
when predicting correctly, m(x, y) is the distance to the decision boundary, i.e. the
minimum perturbation needed to change the prediction; whereas when predicting
wrongly, it is the negation of the distance to the decision boundary, i.e. the minimum
perturbation needed to correct the prediction. We then define
• minimum margin: min1≤i≤nm(xi, yi)
• average margin: 1n
∑n
i=1 |m(xi, yi)|, simply the average distance to the decision
boundary.
Although the definition (3) applies for any norm, we will focus on l2 margin later,
as some current results of implicit minimum margin maximization [33, 37, 38] only
holds for l2 norm, which will be discussed in §3. From now on, we use ‖ · ‖ to denote
the Euclidean norm.
3. Minimum vs. Average Margin: A Case Study
In this section, we study a simple example to demonstrate the trade-off between
minimum and average margin. In statistical learning theory, it is well-known that
we can bound the generalization error of a classifier using empirical margins [39].
In particular, the celebrated support vector machines (SVM) explicitly maximize
the minimum margin (on any linearly separable dataset). In adversarial learning,
1Of course, bdF := clF \ intF.
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however, we argue that average margin is more indicative of the robustness of a
classifier.
Our main observations in this section are: (a) Current machine learning models,
especially when they become deep and powerful, implicitly maximize the minimum
margin to achieve high accuracy; (b) there appears to be an inherent trade-off
between minimum margin and average margin. In particular, by maximizing the
minimum margin, the model also (unconsciously) minimizes the average margin,
hence becomes susceptible to adversarial attacks. Note that we do not claim
minimum margin always contradicts average margin. It does not, as can be easily
shown through carefully constructed toy datasets (e.g. a hightly symmetric dataset).
Our empirical observation is that there does appear to be some tension between the
two notions of margin on real datasets.
To begin with, we first demonstrate that minimum margin is maximized during
standard training. In fact, this can be formally established through the implicit
bias of optimization algorithms, such as (stochastic) gradient descent which is
ubiquitously used in training deep models. Recall that on a (linearly) separable
dataset, (hard-margin) linear SVM explicitly maximizes the minimum margin. The
following result, due to Soudry et al. [33], confirms the same for most models
currently used in machine learning, including logistic regression.
Theorem 1 ([33]). For almost all linearly separable binary datasets and any smooth
decreasing loss with an exponential tail, gradient descent with small constant step
size and any starting point w0 converges to the (unique) solution ŵ of hard-margin
SVM, i.e. limt→∞ wt‖wt‖ =
ŵ
‖ŵ‖ .
Note that the margin of a linear classifier f(x) = w>x, with decision boundary
bdF := {x : w>x = 0}, can be computed in closed-form: d(x,bdF) = |w>x|‖w‖ , which
only depends on the direction of the weight vector w. Thus, Theorem 1 implies in
particular that if we optimize logistic regression by gradient descent on a linearly
separable dataset, then we implicitly maximize the minimum margin, just as in SVM.
Besides linear classifiers, the same implicit bias towards maximizing the minimum
margin has also been discovered for deep networks [37, 38].
It is then natural to ask the next question: How does average margin change
during training? To answer this question, we train a binary logistic regression
(LR) using gradient descent on MNIST to discriminate 0’s from 1’s. Note that
the subset of MNIST consisting of only 0’s and 1’s is indeed linearly separable,
as LR achieves zero training error (see Figure 4 in appendix). All conditions of
Theorem 1 are thus satisfied, and we expect LR to maximize minimum margin.
Indeed, Figure 1a confirms that the minimum margin continues to increase during
training until it approaches that of hard-margin SVM, as predicted by Theorem 1.
Meanwhile, the average margin decreases drastically after a few epochs at the very
beginning, and then keeps decreasing. Interestingly, the minimum margin continues
to increase while the average margin continues to decrease even after the training
error reaches zero, which means the decision boundary still changes even after
training error diminishes.
To gain further insight, in Figure 1b we plot the histogram of margins at different
training epochs. We observe that the margin distribution shifts towards the left
during training and eventually approaches that of hard-margin SVM. In other words,
during training the majority of data is pushed towards the decision boundary, leading
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(a) Margins during train-
ing of LR.
Upper: Average margin
on training and test set.
Lower: Minimum mar-
gin on training and test
set.
(b) Margin histograms on the training set. First 5 plots:
Margin histograms of LR during training. Last plot: Margin
histogram of SVM, which LR margins converge to. During
training, the histogram continues shifting towards left.
(c) Visualization of adversarial examples at different epochs
during training. First row: adversarial examples for 0. Sec-
ond row: adversarial examples for 1. Adversarial examples
in the same column are generated in the same epoch. Adver-
sarial examples gradually become imperceptible. Zoom the
figure for better visualization.
LR to become more and more vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Indeed, Figure 1c
confirms this by visualizing the adversarial examples constructed at different training
epochs. Note that for a linear classifier the adversarial example with minimum
perturbation can be explicitly determined as
(7) xadv = x− w>x‖w‖2w,
which is the point on the decision boundary that is closest to the training example x.
As shown in Figure 1c, the adversarial examples gradually become more and more
imperceptible, indicating that LR becomes more and more vulnerable to adversarial
attacks.
A few remarks are in order. First, we have carefully designed our experiment so
that (a) the theoretical results in Theorem 1 apply; (b) the margins and adversarial
examples can be explicitly computed. However, similar phenomenon is also observed
for deep models on different datasets where the conditions of Theorem 1 may be
violated or the margins can only be approximately computed; see §5 for more of
these experiments. Second, we remark that the decrease of average margin cannot be
caused by overfitting. This is because the test accuracy continues to decrease during
training (see training curves in Figure 4 of the appendix). Moreover, we observe
that the average margin decreases on both training and test sets. To summarize, we
conclude that practically, deep models try to maximize the minimum margin during
training at the expense of sacrificing the average margin, hence become susceptible
to adversarial attacks. To address this issue, in the next section we propose to
explicitly optimize the average margin through appropriate regularization.
4. An Average Margin Regularizer
In this section, we propose a regularization function to explicitly promote average
margin. We first handle linear classifiers in §4.1 through maximizing the average
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margin in the input space directly. For nonlinear classifiers, maximizing the margin
in the input space directly is intractable. Instead, we maximize a lower bound
of input space margins in §4.2, through simultaneously maximizing feature space
margin and controlling the Lipschitz constant of the network.
The most straightforward way to improve robustness of a classifier is through
explicit regularization. In particular, we consider the following regularized problem:
(8) min
f :X→Rc
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ(yi, f(xi))− λ · 1
n
n∑
i=1
1yi=yˆi · dτ (xi,bdFyi)
where φ is the loss function we use to measure the accuracy of our classifier f , {Fk}
are the sets induced by f (using the argmax rule) , λ ≥ 0 is the regularization
constant that balances the two objectives, and dτ = min{τ, d} is the truncated
distance. In particular, we only maximize the margin when the classifier makes a
correct prediction and the margin is capped at τ to avoid being dominated by some
outliers. We show next how to solve (8) when f is a binary linear classifier.
4.1. Binary Linear Classifier. In this section we assume there are two classes,
i.e. c = 2 and we consider the linear classifier f(x) = w>x (w.l.o.g. we omit
the bias term). Correspondingly, let F+ = {x ∈ X : w>x ≥ 0} and the distance
d(x,bdF+) =
|w>x|
‖w‖ . The regularized problem (8) reduces to
min
‖w‖=1
n∑
i=1
φ(yiw
>xi)− λ ·
n∑
i=1
[yiw
>xi]τ0 ,(9)
where [t]τ0 = min(max(t, 0), τ). The second regularization term can be written as a
difference of two convex functions. Indeed, define Hs(x) = max(0, s− x), then
−[t]τ0 = Hτ (t)−H0(t) + τ,(10)
and the objective function simplifies to
min
‖w‖=1
n∑
i=1
φ(yiw
>xi) + λ ·
n∑
i=1
[Hτ −H0](yiw>xi),(11)
where λ ≥ 0 and τ ≥ 0 are tuning hyperparameters.
Quite pleasantly, our average margin regularizer not only promotes robustness,
it also retains Fisher consistency (aka classification-calibrated), namely that the
classifier we obtain by minimizing the regularized objective in (9) still approaches
the Bayes optimal classifier, as sample size n increases to infinity.
Definition 1 (Fisher consistency [40]). Suppose φ : R→ R is a loss function and
η ∈ [0, 1]. For any α ∈ R, define the conditional φ-risk as Cφη (α) = ηφ(α) + (1 −
η)φ(1− α). We say a loss φ is Fisher consistent if for any η 6= 12 ,
inf
α:α(2η−1)≤0
Cφη (α) > inf
α∈R
Cφη (α).(12)
For a Fischer consistent loss functions φ, (12) implies that to minimize the φ-risk,
α should satisfy α(2η − 1) > 0, i.e. the decision α of our classifier should match
the decision sign(2η − 1) of the Bayes classifier (which is optimal under the 0-1
loss). Fisher-consistency is a necessary condition for any reasonable loss, if our goal
is to approximate the Bayes optimal classifier. The following result confirms the
Fisher-consistency of our regularized objective (9) (see the proof in appendix).
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN MINIMUM AND AVERAGE MARGIN 7
Theorem 2. Suppose the loss function φ is decreasing, continuous, bounded below
and φ′(0) < 0. Let ψ = Hτ − H0 be our average margin regularizer. Then the
regularized loss ` = φ+ λψ is Fisher consistent for any λ, τ ≥ 0.
The above condition on the loss φ is reasonable: it basically guarantees φ itself to
be Fisher consistent. Common loss functions, such as the logistic loss, exponential
loss and hinge loss, all satisfy this condition. Thus, our average margin regularizer,
when combined with these typical, Fisher consistent loss functions, remains Fisher
consistent.
4.2. Extension to Multiclass Deep Models. For deep neural networks, even
computing the margin in the input space is already NP-hard [41, 19], let alone
optimizing it. However, the margin in the feature space provides a lower bound
of the margin in the input space. For example, let f be a deep neural network
with L layers, f(x) = WL · σ(WL−1 · σ(· · ·σ(W1 · x))), where σ is the activation
function. Let Φ(x) be the output of the second last fully connected layer, i.e.
Φ(x) = σ(WL−1 · σ(· · ·σ(W1 · x))), then
(13) ‖Φ(x1)− Φ(x2)‖ ≤ Lip(Φ) ‖x1 − x2‖ ,
where Lip(Φ) is the Lipschitz constant of the feature map Φ. The tightness of
this bound is determined by the Lipschitz constant of the model. For example, if
the model is 1-Lipschitz with Lip(φ) = 1, then the margin in the input space X
is exactly lower bounded by the margin in the feature space {Φ(x) : x ∈ X}. The
bound (13) motivates a natural way to optimize the margin in input space: we
simultaneously fix the Lipschitz constant and maximize the margin in feature space.
Note that this perspective allows us to treat any deep network as first performing a
nonlinear feature transform through Φ, and then applying a linear classifier on top.
The Lipschitz constant can be bounded by the product of norms of the weight
matrices
∏
i ‖Wi‖2, whereWi is the weight matrix in layer i, assuming the activation
function is 1-Lipschitz, for instance ReLU [1]. To control the overall Lipschitz
constant Lip(Φ), ideally, we want to enforce the Lipschitz constant of each layer
to be exactly 1, namely constraining the spectral norm of each weight matrix
Wi to be approximately 1. Inspired by [11, 42], we add an orthogonal penalty
β
∥∥WiW>i − I∥∥2F , into our training objective, which encourages the weight matrices
to be orthogonal hence having spectral norm close to 1. For convolutional layers,
we first flatten the convolutional filter and then apply the above penalty.
Once the Lipschitz constant is bounded, we directly maximize the average margin
in the feature space, as a computationally efficient lower bound for promoting the
average margin in the input space. Since our classifier is linear in the feature space,
the distance to the decision boundary can be computed as in §4.1:
(14) d(x,bdFyˆ) = min
k 6=yˆ
(wyˆ −wk)>Φ(x),
where wk is the (normalized) weight vector in the final layer for the k-th class.
Similar to the binary case, we only maximize the margin for correctly classified
examples and truncate the margin if it exceeds the threshold τ . In the end, our
regularized objective is,
(15)
n∑
i=1
φ (yi, f(xi))− λ
[
min
k 6=yi
(wyi −wk)>Φ(xi)
]τ
0
+ β
∑
1≤l≤L
‖WlW>l − I‖2F,
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where the first term is the standard training loss (such as cross-entropy), the third
term is the orthogonal constraint for controlling the Lipschitz constant of the
network, and the second term is the average margin penalty in the feature space,
which also maximizes the input space average margin, provided that the Lipschitz
constant of the network is indeed close to unity.
5. Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments to (a) verify the minimum-average margin
trade-off on a variety of (nonlinear) deep models; (b) demonstrate the effectiveness of
our average margin regularizer. First, we train six models with various architectures
on MNIST and CIFAR10 to verify the trade-off again. Then, we retrain these
models with our average margin regularizer, and confirm that our regularizer indeed
can effectively promote the average margin. Finally, we compare our average margin
regularizer with other state-of-the-art defense techniques in the literature and find
that our regularizer achieves comparable performance in terms of robustness and
accuracy.
5.1. Approximating Distance. In general, exactly computing the distance to
the decision boundary of deep models is intractable [41, 19]. Instead, we use the
following Lipschitz lower bound as a reasonable approximation:
Theorem 3 ([16]). Suppose f : Rd → Rc is a multiclass classifier (with argmax
prediction rule). Then, for any r > 0:
d(x,bdFyˆ) ≥ min
{
min
k 6=yˆ
fyˆ(x)−fk(x)
Lkx
, r
}
,(16)
where Lkx is the local Lipschitz constant of fyˆ(x)− fk(x) over the ball B(x, r)
The lower bound (16) is in fact exact when f is linear, and for general nonlinear
f , it is reasonably close to the true distance, as shown empirically in [17]. Here,
our estimate for the Lipschitz constant Lkx is simply the maximum norm of the
gradient (difference) of many random samples in the ball B(x, r), as we found this
simple strategy is reasonably efficient and accurate. For space limits, we defer the
experimental details on approximating this distance to the appendix.
5.2. Verifying the Margin Trade-off again on Deep Nonlinear Models.
Due to space limits, here we only present the experimental results on the CIFAR10
dataset, while results on MNIST can be found in the appendix. For each model, we
plot the average margin and minimum margin w.r.t. the number of training epochs
in Figure 2. It is clear that similar phenomenon as those in §3 can be observed: the
minimum margin continues increasing while at the same time the average margin
keeps decreasing. This again highlights an intrinsic trade-off between minimum
margin and average margin. In addition, we consistently observed that the average
margin continues to decrease even after the training/test error has saturated (see
training curves Figure 5 in the appendix).
To investigate how the margin distribution changes during training, we plot the
histograms of margins in Figure 8 (appendix). As training proceeds, we observe
again the margin distribution shifts towards left, meaning the majority of data
points is pushed closer to the boundary. To some extent, this provides compelling
explanation of the non-robustness of deep models: although achieving high accuracy
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Avg vs Min CIFAR-LR Avg vs Min CIFAR-MLP Avg vs Min CIFAR-CNN
Figure 2. Average and minimum margin during training of differ-
ent models on CIFAR10.
Avg Margin of LR Avg Margin of MLP Avg Margin of CNN
Figure 3. Average margin of regularized and standard training.
by maximizing the minimum margin, the average margin, which is a better indicator
of robustness, is at serious jeopardy. Note that early stopping, while helps preventing
the average margin to decrease unnecessarily, is not sufficient by itself to promote
average margin. Instead, an explicit average margin regularizer is more effective, as
we show next.
5.3. Average Margin Regularizer. We retrain six models augmented with our
average margin regularizer, and compare the average margin with standard training
in Figure 3. It is clear that with our average margin regularizer, the regularized
models no longer sacrifice the average margin during training. For all six models,
adding the average margin regularizer significantly improves adversarial robustness.
For example, the average margin of LR and MLP become 2 ∼ 3 times more than
those of models with standard training. For CNN, the average margin is increased
by a factor of 1.5 ∼ 2.
Next, we compare our regularizer with Lipschitz constant regularization. In our
regularizer, we use the orthogonal constraint ‖WW> − I‖2F to control the Lipschitz
constant. The idea of using orthogonal constraint as Lipschitz constant regularizer
has been proposed before (e.g. Paserval networks [11] and defensive quantization
[42]). Here, we prvide a comparison between Lipschitz constant regularization and
our average margin regularizer. We evaluate models using clean accuracy, robust
accuracy under l2 norm projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [2], and the average
margin. We run 1000 iterations of PGD to generate adversarial examples, whose
success serves as a good approximation of robust accuracy. The results can be
found in Table 1. As we can see, when , the amount of allowed perturbations, is
small, the accuracy of our average margin regularizer is comparable to that of the
Lipschitz constant regularizer (LCR); but as  becomes larger, the average margin
regularizer consistently outperforms the latter. Interestingly, LCR alone can also
improve adversarial robustness marginally [11, 42], when  is small. This may be
caused by implicit max-margin effect of the loss function used in training. However,
as  becomes larger, the robust accuracy of LCR is inferior to our method, sometimes
even worse than standard training, which is also confirmed in the experimental
results in [11, 36]. This implies that controlling Lipschitz constant alone may not be
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Table 1. Comparision between AMR (our average margin reg-
ularizer) and LCR (Lipschitz constant regularization). Column
4-9: clean accuracy. Column 5-8: robust accuracy under l2 PGD
attack. The last column: average margin.
Models Method Clean  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0 Avg Margin
MNIST
MLP
Std 98.24 89.26 49.23 15.78 5.06 0.80
LCR 95.99 91.12 80.62 60.56 34.07 1.36
AMR 96.01 91.18 81.01 62.93 38.44 1.41
CNN
Std 99.14 95.95 90.48 88.72 87.52 1.01
LCR 99.29 97.21 87.83 58.30 26.96 1.34
AMR 99.25 97.90 97.60 97.51 97.33 1.40
Models Method Clean  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4 Avg Margin
CIFAR
MLP
Std 54.04 39.77 26.67 16.77 9.95 0.17
LCR 50.09 46.23 41.65 37.09 32.62 0.45
AMR 50.36 46.28 42.81 39.06 35.67 0.54
CNN
Std 78.77 54.32 39.81 37.14 36.27 0.09
LCR 80.54 70.84 58.72 44.82 32.54 0.26
AMR 78.12 69.59 59.84 49.02 38.65 0.31
Table 2. Comparison between 5 different training methods: Std
(standard training), DD (deep defense [36]), Adv (PGD adversarial
training [12]), MMR (maximum margin regularizer [35]), and AMR
(ours). Column 4: clean accuracy. Column 5-8: robust accuracy
under l2 PGD attack.
Method Clean  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0
M
N
IS
T LeNet
Std 98.98 95.75 80.59 44.36 22.64
DD 99.34 97.64 92.09 83.53 79.35
Adv 99.48 97.45 91.99 88.88 87.51
AMR 99.01 96.80 94.03 93.61 93.12
LeNetSmall MMR 97.43 89.90 58.86 23.95 6.80AMR 97.83 91.94 73.70 32.56 8.79
Method Clean  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4
C
IF
A
R ConvNet
Std 76.61 56.47 37.37 30.17 28.89
DD 79.10 68.95 59.51 56.84 56.38
Adv 75.27 68.79 61.79 54.35 47.00
AMR 76.77 68.00 57.87 52.38 50.03
LeNetSmall MMR 59.07 49.01 39.42 30.41 22.53AMR 68.40 61.33 53.84 46.03 39.05
enough to train a robust model. Instead, one needs to maximize the average margin
explicitly.
We also compare our method with deep defense (DD) [36], PGD adversarial train-
ing (Adv) [12] and the maximum margin regularizer (MMR) [35], which maximizes
the linear region of ReLU netowrks. The results are shown in Table 2. Compared
with standard training, our method can significantly improve model robustness. On
MNIST, our method achieves overall better robust accuracy. On CIFAR10, our
method achieves comparable results as adversarial training and deep defense. In
addition, our method consistently outperforms MMR on both datasets. Moreover,
our method is more efficient than adversarial training and deep defense. In fact, ad-
versarial training would increase the training time by the number of PGD iterations
(typically tens or hundreds), and deep defense is even more time consuming, to a
point where it can only be applied as fine-tuning [36], while the training time of our
method is roughly the same as the standard training.
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6. Conclusion
In this work, we studied adversarial robustness from a margin perspective. We
discovered the intrinsic trade-off between minimum and average margin, which
appears across different models and datasets. We gave strong empirical evidence
that deep models maximize the minimum margin during training to achieve high
accuracy, but at the expense of decreasing the average margin significantly hence
becoming more susceptible to adversarial attacks. To address the issue, we designed
a new regularizer to explicitly maximize average margin and to retain Fisher
consistency. Our extensive experiments confirmed the effectiveness of our regularizer.
In the future, we will theoretically analyze the trade-off to provide further insights to
the phenomenon. Moreover, we plan to go beyond just maximizing average margin,
by controlling other margin distribution statistics such as variance.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Indeed, according to the definitions in (5) and (2) we have
r(x) = inf{‖z‖ : x+ z 6∈ Fyˆ(x), x+ z ∈ X}(17)
= inf{‖(x+ z)− x‖ : x+ z 6∈ Fyˆ(x), x+ z ∈ X}(18)
= d(x, F¯yˆ(x)) = d(x,bdFyˆ(x))(19)

Proof of Theorem 2. Since both φ and ψ are bounded below, ` is also bounded
below. Denote m = infα∈R C`η(α). We need to show infα(2η−1)≤0 C`η(α) is strictly
greater than m for all η 6= 12 . We first consider the case η > 12 . For the case η < 12 ,
the proof is similar.
The derivative of Cφη (α) at zero is (2η − 1)φ′(0) < 0. Thus ∃δ1 > 0 such that
∀α ∈ (0, δ1) satisfies Cφη (α) < Cφη (0).
The right hand derivative of ψ at zero is negative, thus there ∃δ2 > 0 such that
∀α ∈ (0, δ2) satisfies ψ(α) < ψ(0). Notice that ψ(α) is constant when α ≤ 0. Thus
∀α ∈ (0, δ2) satisfies Cψη (α) < Cψη (0).
Notice that Clη(α) = Cφη (α)+λCψη (α). Combining above arguments, there exists a
sufficiently small α0, such that 0 < α0 < min(δ1, δ2), and C`η(α0) < C`η(0). Splitting
the interval (−∞, 0] into (−∞,−α0] and [−α0, 0], it is sufficient to show that both
(20) inf
α≤−α0
C`η(α) > m
and
(21) inf
−α0≤α≤0
C`η(α) > m
hold.
For α ≤ −α0,
C`η(α)− C`η(−α) = (2η − 1)(`(α)− `(−α))(22)
≥ (2η − 1)(`(0)− `(−α))(23)
≥ (2η − 1)(`(0)− `(α0))(24)
> 0.(25)
The inequalities (23) and (24) are because l is a decreasing function. The inequality
(25) is because the specific choice of α0 strictly decreases the value of l at zero.
Namely, flipping the sign of α can strictly decrease the value of C`η(α). Thus,
inf
α≤−α0
C`η(α) ≥ (2η − 1)(`(0)− `(α0)) + C`η(−α)(26)
≥ (2η − 1)(`(0)− `(α0)) +m(27)
> m.(28)
For −α0 ≤ α ≤ 0, by continuity there exists a minimizer α? for C`η(α) on this
compact set. If α? 6= 0, then we can again flip the sign of α to get a strictly smaller
value. Thus C`η(α?) > C`η(−α?) ≥ m. If α? = 0, then
(29) C`η(0) > C
`
η(α0) ≥ m.
Hence the theorem holds. 
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Appendix B. Training Curves
Figure 4 shows the training loss, training error and test error of logistic regression
in Section 3. As training goes, the error rate on both training set and test set
never increase, thus the logistic regression is not overfitting, although trained with
excessive number of epochs. This again hightlights that the trade-off between
minimum and average margin cannot be caused by overfitting.
Figure 4. Training curves of logistic regression in Section 3 classi-
fying 0 and 1 on MNIST. For the ease of illustration, x-axis is in log
scale. Left: Training loss w.r.t. epochs. Middle: Training error
w.r.t. epochs. Right: Test error w.r.t. epochs. The training error
reaches zero, thus the subset of MNIST consisting of 0’s and 1’s is
linear separable. Hence, this dataset strictly satisfies the contition
in Theorem 1.
Figure 5 shows the training curves of six models in Section 5 by standarded
training. Although there exists a generalization gap between training errors and
test errors, the test errors never increase, thus the trade-off between minimum and
average margin cannot be caused by overfitting.
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Figure 5. Training curves of 3 models on MNIST and 3 models
on CIFAR10 by standard training. First Row : MNIST models.
Second Row : CIFAR10 models.
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Appendix C. Minimum-average Margin Trade-off for MNIST Models
Figure 6 shows the minimum and average margin trade-off for MNIST models
2. A similar trade-off between minimum and average margin can be observed as
discussed in Sections 3 and 5. The minimum margin keeps increasing while the
average margin keeps decreasing. The only exception is the average margin of
MNIST-CNN. But the range of margin in the figure is very small (from 0.94 to 1.08),
in which case the Lipschitz constant estimation in Theorem 3 could be inaccurate.
Figure 6. Average margin and minimum margin during training
of 3 MNIST models.
2In the figure of average margin of MNIST-LR (top left), we shift the curve of average margin
on training set by a small constant 0.001, to avoid overlapping of two curves. This is only for
illustration purpose.
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Appendix D. Margin Histograms of MNIST Models during Training
We plot margin histograms for three MNIST models in Figure 7.
(a) Margin histograms of MNIST-LR on
training set
(b) Margin histograms of MNIST-LR on
test set
(c) Margin histograms of MNIST-MLP on
training set
(d) Margin histograms of MNIST-MLP on
test set
(e) Margin histograms of MNIST-CNN on
training set
(f) Margin histograms of MNIST-CNN on
test set
Figure 7. Margin histograms of MNIST models at different epochs
during training. Top: Histograms of MNIST-LR.Mid: Histograms
of MNIST-MLP. Bottom: Hostograms of MNIST-CNN.
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Appendix E. Margin Histograms of CIFAR Models during Training
We plot margin histograms for three CIFAR models in Figure 8.
(a) Margin histograms of CIFAR-LR on
training set
(b) Margin histograms of CIFAR-LR on test
set
(c) Margin histograms of CIFAR-MLP on
training set
(d) Margin histograms of CIFAR-MLP on
test set
(e) Margin histograms of CIFAR-CNN on
training set
(f) Margin histograms of CIFAR-CNN on
test set
Figure 8. Margin histograms of CIFAR models at different epochs
during training. Top: Histograms of CIFAR-LR. Mid: Histograms
of CIFAR-MLP. Bottom: Histograms of CIFAR-CNN.
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Appendix F. Detailed Experiment Setting
Model Architecture:
• MNIST-LR and CIFAR-LR: Multiclass logistic regression.
• MNIST-MLP and CIFAR-MLP: Neural network with one hidden layer.
The hidden layer has 1024 neurons and relu activation.
• MNIST-CNN and MNIST-CNN: Two AlexNet-Like convolutional neu-
ral networks with a slight difference. They are exactly the same as the
models used by Weng et al. [17], Carlini and Wagner [4]. Dropout is used
to alleviate overfitting on CIFAR10. No data augmentation is used.
• ConvNet: A convolutional neural network with 5 convolutional layers,
used in [36].
• LeNet: LeNet, consists of two convolutional layers and two fully connected
layers.
• LeNetSmall: A convolutional neural network with similar structure to
LeNet, but with fewer filers. This model is same as the one used in [35]. On
CIFAR10, data augmentation (random crop and random flip) is used.
Standard Training: We use SGD (learning rate 0.01) with momentum (0.9)
and nestorv to train all six models. Batch size is set to 128. Linear models (LR) are
trained for 1000 epochs. Nonlinear models (MLP, CNN) are trained for 200 epochs.
Average Margin Regularizer: λ = 0.1 and β = 10−3 are used for all models,
while different τ ’s are used for different models. τ is tuned such that it is on the
same order as the Lipschitz constant of the model. MNIST-LR and MNIST-MLP
use τ = 5. MNIST-CNN use τ = 10. CIFAR-LR use τ = 5. CIFAR-MLP and
CIFAR-CNN use τ = 10. The idea is using larger τ for deeper models. The spectral
norm of weights across layers may not be exactly 1, even after adding orthogonal
constraint. In fact, the product of spectral norm will become larger as the model
becomes deeper. Thus, one should use larger truncation parameter, since the range of
margin in feature space may be larger. Following same idea, LeNet and LeNetSmall
use τ = 40; ConvNet uses τ = 50.
In addition, for fair comparison, we set the same β = 10−3 to train models with
Lipschitz constant regularization.
Adversarial Training: We use PGD attack to perform adversarial training.
We set the number of iterations 40 and step size 0.01. On MNIST, the perturbation
budget  is set to 2.0; on CIFAR,  is set to 0.4.
Attack Method: Through out the experiment, we use projected gradient descent
(PGD) attack to evaluate the robust accuracy. We set step size 0.01 and number
of iterations 1000. Increasing the number of iterations does not change the robust
accuracy much, thus 1000 iterations is sufficient to generate strong adversarial
examples.
Approximating Distance When using Theorem 3 to approximate the distance
to decision boundary, we need to estimation the Lipchitz constant of the network
in a small neighbourhood around the input. Following [20], we simply take the
maximum norm of gradient in that neighbourhood. Throughout the experiments,
we set r = 5 and the sampling size equal to 1024× 50 (except for linear classifiers,
whose sampling size is 1). For linear logistic regression, we perform estimation in
every epoch; for nonlinear classifiers, we only perform estimation at certain epochs:
1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 80, 120, 160 and 200, where we perform more estimations at
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the beginning, as distances may change drastically in initial stages. Due to efficiency
concerns, the estimation is performed on a subset of size 500, which is randomly
chosen (with a fixed random seed) from the original training and test sets.
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